Intergenerational spillovers in disability insurance by Dahl, G.B. & Gielen, A.C. (Anne)
Intergenerational Spillovers in Disability Insurance∗
Gordon B. Dahl
†
Anne C. Gielen
‡
January 30, 2018
Abstract: Does participation in a social assistance program by parents have spillovers
on their children's own participation, future labor market attachment, and human
capital investments? While intergenerational concerns have ﬁgured prominently in
policy debates for decades, causal evidence is scarce due to nonrandom participation
and data limitations. In this paper we exploit a 1993 policy reform in the Netherlands
which tightened disability insurance (DI) criteria for existing claimants, and use rich
panel data to link parents to children's long-run outcomes. The key to our regression
discontinuity design is that the reform applied to younger cohorts, while older co-
horts were exempted from the new rules. We ﬁnd that children of parents who were
pushed out of DI or had their beneﬁts reduced are 11% less likely to participate in
DI themselves, do not alter their use of other government safety net programs, and
earn 2% more in the labor market as adults. The combination of reduced government
transfers and increased tax revenue results in a ﬁscal gain of 5,900 euros per treated
parent due to child spillovers by 2014. Moreover, children of treated parents com-
plete an extra 0.12 years of schooling on average, an investment consistent with an
anticipated future with less reliance on DI. Our ﬁndings have important implications
for the evaluation of this and other policy reforms: ignoring parent-to-child spillovers
understates the long-run cost savings of the Dutch reform by between 21 and 40% in
present discounted value terms.
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1 Introduction
Parental participation in social assistance programs could inﬂuence a child's own
participation, and possibly even a child's future earnings and human capital invest-
ments. Arguments about the presence, type, and size of intergenerational spillovers
have ﬁgured prominently in policy debates for decades. On the one hand, parental
participation could create a cycle of government dependence and reduced employment
within the family. Observing a parent out of the labor force and on public assistance
could alter a child's perceptions about the relative costs, beneﬁts, and stigma as-
sociated with the two alternatives.1 On the other hand, intergenerational patterns
could simply reﬂect shared negative environmental or genetic factors. Characteris-
tics like poor health, bad neighborhoods, or reduced employment opportunities could
be correlated across generations, creating mechanical intergenerational links which
do not reﬂect a behavioral response on the part of the child. Figuring out whether
the observed associations within a family are causal is crucial for understanding the
reasons behind persistent participation and designing eﬀective policies. Moreover,
determining the long-term ﬁscal impacts of government assistance programs requires
a full intergenerational accounting which includes changes in taxes paid and other
transfer program receipt.
Estimating intergenerational spillovers is a diﬃcult empirical problem because a
parent's participation is not random. Credible identiﬁcation requires an exogenous
shock which aﬀects a parent's participation, but does not directly aﬀect their chil-
dren. On top of this, one needs a dataset which links parents to children, contains
a detailed set of outcome variables, and follows families over a long period of time.
Because of these challenges, the existing evidence base on causal eﬀects is scarce. We
overcome these identiﬁcation challenges by taking advantage of a policy reform which
generates quasi-experimental variation in social program participation combined with
rich administrative datasets.
Our setting is disability insurance (DI) in the Netherlands and a 1993 reform
prompted by the rising costs of the Dutch system. In 1969, two years after its intro-
duction, 4% of the Dutch working age population participated in DI, but by the late
1980s, participation had risen to 12% (Koning and Lindeboom, 2015). At its peak,
the program cost 4.2% of GDP, and was not ﬁscally sustainable. Similar trends, while
not always as dramatic, have occurred in most industrialized nations, including the
U.S., the U.K., and other European countries (see Burkhauser, Daly, McVicar, and
1There could also be information transmission about how to enroll or diﬀerential child investments
due to changing resource constraints.
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Wilkins, 2014). Due to a series of reforms, including the one we study, DI participa-
tion in the Netherlands dropped to 7%. Dutch DI payments now constitute around
2.1% of GDP, which compares to 2.3% on average in Europe and 1.7% in the U.S.
The 1993 Dutch reform simultaneously tightened eligibility criteria and lowered
payment generosity. It forced current DI recipients to be re-examined by a medical
doctor and subjected to a new set of rules which made them weakly worse oﬀ. Some
individuals received lower payments because their degree of disability was reduced,
and others were disqualiﬁed from the program entirely. Importantly, the more strin-
gent re-examination rules only applied to individuals less than age 45 as of August 1,
1993, since at the last minute older individuals currently on DI were grandfathered
in. This diﬀerential application of the new rules creates an age discontinuity, with
individuals around the cutoﬀ being similar in all dimensions except for exposure to
the stricter DI rules. Using a regression discontinuity (RD) design, Borghans, Gielen,
and Luttmer (2014) ﬁnd that approximately 4% of DI participants exited DI due to
the more stringent rules and that annual beneﬁts fell by around 1,000 euro, or 10%.
A similar analysis, applied to our sample of parents with children, comprises the ﬁrst
stage of our paper.2
The goal of our paper is to explore how a parent's reduction in DI use aﬀects their
children's choices. We examine children's future participation in DI and other social
assistance programs, labor market outcomes as adults, and human capital investments
when young. Since the DI rule changes aﬀected parents on both the intensive and
extensive margins, we focus on the reduced form eﬀects of the DI reform on child
outcomes, but also present IV estimates which scale these eﬀects by the parental
drop in DI payments (treating exit from the program as a reduction in payments to
0). We use an RD design, where the running variable is the age of the parent and the
dependent variables are child outcomes.
Our ﬁrst result is that there is a strong link in DI usage between parents and
children. Children whose parents are subject to the harsher DI rules are 1.1 percentage
points less likely to have ever participated in DI 21 years after the reform date.
This is as of 2014, when children are 37 years old on average and have an ever-
participation rate of 10 percent. The corresponding IV estimate reveals that for
every 1,000 euro drop in parental payments due to the reform, child participation
drops by 0.9 percentage points. Using cumulative income received from DI as the
dependent variable instead, children of treated parents received roughly 1,600 euros
less in DI payments, which is sizable compared to the overall mean of 10,100 euros.
2We ﬁnd slightly larger eﬀects for our sample of parents with children, with 5.4% of parents
exiting DI due to the reform and annual beneﬁts dropping by 1,300 euro on average.
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To get a fuller picture of intergenerational spillovers and ﬁscal impacts, we next
assess whether a child's taxable earnings and participation in other social support
programs change. These eﬀects are typically ignored, but only with this information
can the total spillover eﬀect be calculated on the government's budget.3 We ﬁnd
that cumulative earnings up to 2014 rise by approximately 7,200 euros, or a little less
than 2%, for children of parents subject to the less generous DI rules. In contrast,
we ﬁnd no detectable change in cumulative unemployment insurance receipt, general
assistance (i.e., traditional cash welfare), or other miscellaneous safety net programs.
The estimated cumulative increase in taxes minus government transfers is approxi-
mately 3,500 euros per child. While roughly 45% of this amount can be attributed to
cost savings from lower DI payments, the remaining is due to increased tax revenue
resulting from higher earnings. Since parents in our sample have an average of 1.7
children living with them at the time of the reform, this implies 5,900 euros in positive
intergenerational spillovers per treated parent.
To gauge the importance of these ﬁscal spillover eﬀects, we compare them to the
direct eﬀects of the reform on parents. Up through 2013, when parents around the
reform cutoﬀ reach age 65, we ﬁnd a large reduction in a parent's cumulative DI
beneﬁts, a modest increase in other beneﬁt receipt, and a statistically insigniﬁcant
eﬀect in taxes paid. Compared to our child estimates up through 2013, we ﬁnd that
children account for 21% of the net ﬁscal savings of the reform in present discounted
value (PDV) terms. This percentage, although sizable, understates the long term
savings due to child spillovers. This is because when parents turn 65, they become
subject to mandatory retirement and DI beneﬁts cease,4 while their children have
an additional 30 years or so of eligibility and work life remaining. Extrapolating the
estimated child spillovers beyond 2013, we calculate that 40% of the PDV of savings
in the long run is due to children.
We then turn to children's educational attainment as a possible mechanism, and
ﬁnd intriguing evidence for anticipatory investments. When a parent is subject to
the reform which tightened DI beneﬁts, their child invests in a statistically and eco-
nomically signiﬁcant 0.12 extra years of education relative to an overall mean of 11.5
years. The largest increase occurs for the margin of upper secondary school, with
a 2.2 percentage point increase in the graduation rate. Since most schooling takes
place before children have entered the labor market, these ﬁndings provide suggestive
evidence that children of treated parents plan for a future with less reliance on DI
3A similar point, although not in the intergenerational context, is made in a recent working paper
by Autor, Kostol, Mogstad, and Seltzer (2017).
4At age 65, parents transition to state pensions, which do not depend on employment history.
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in part by investing in their labor market skills. As expected, the schooling eﬀect
is concentrated on children who are less than age 18 at the time the reform was
implemented, since these children have more time to alter their educational plans.
We consider several explanations for our results. We begin by ruling out various
possibilities which others have postulated for intergenerational spillovers. It cannot be
information about how to apply for the program, as all parents have been through the
DI screening process. Likewise, reductions in stigma from seeing a parent participate
seems improbable, as both treated and untreated parents have already been on DI for
a long time (7.5 years on average). The explanation is also not increased investments
in children due to increases in family income or parental supervision. This is because
the reform caused parental leisure to decrease and work hours to increase, with total
parental income changing little in the short run but declining in the long run.
Instead, the two explanations most consistent with our ﬁndings are that children
experience a scarring eﬀect or learn about formal employment. Children whose par-
ents are kicked oﬀ of DI or have their beneﬁts reduced may infer they cannot rely
on the government to take care of them, similar to the scarring eﬀect talked about
in Malmendier and Nagel (2011) in a diﬀerent context. This type of scarring can
explain why treated children invest more in education and work more in the future,
even though they face the same labor market and social safety net as their untreated
peers. Learning about formal employment via a parental role model is also consistent
with our ﬁndings; participation in the labor market rises substantially for treated
parents, with over 60% of lost beneﬁts being replaced with earnings.
Despite the importance of intergenerational spillovers in policy discussions, there
is remarkably little existing causal evidence. As surveyed by Black and Devereux
(2011), there are many observational studies which document intergenerational links
in the use of social assistance, but few with credible research designs. There are
only a handful of papers which have tried to use exogeneous sources of variation for
identiﬁcation. Antel (1992) uses state-level welfare beneﬁts and net migration ﬂows
in a Heckman selection model and ﬁnds evidence for intergenerational links. Levine
and Zimmerman (1996) use variation in state beneﬁt levels and local labor market
conditions and conclude that most of the intergenerational correlation in welfare use
is not causal. Hartley, Lamarche, and Ziliak (2017) use variation across U.S. states
in the timing of welfare reform implementation and ﬁnd a mother's use of welfare
signiﬁcantly increases the chances her daughter will participate as well. Finally, Dahl,
Kostol, and Mogstad (2014) use a random judge assignment design and ﬁnd that DI
participation by parents in Norway increases the chances their child will participate
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as well.5
Our paper makes several contributions to this sparse literature. First, we lever-
age a nationwide policy reform which tightened DI eligibility rules in a way which
generates convincing quasi-experimental variation. Moreover, we follow children to
an age in adulthood when DI participation is relatively common. Another contri-
bution is that we calculate the total ﬁscal costs of the intergenerational spillover,
including changes in a child's DI payments, taxes, and other transfers, rather than
simply focusing on the participation margin. We also provide a comparison of the
cumulative cost savings from each generation, documenting the importance of both
for the government's long-term budget. Finally, we ﬁnd robust evidence that chil-
dren invest more in schooling, consistent with an anticipated future with less reliance
on government assistance. These novel ﬁndings highlight the strength and nature of
parent-child interactions, and the importance of considering spillover eﬀects in policy
debates about social assistance programs.6
More broadly, our study complements a related literature which looks at other
shocks to parents which have the potential to change children's long-run outcomes.7
There is also a related literature on disability insurance programs and their labor
supply eﬀects.8
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. The next section provides back-
ground on disability insurance in the Netherlands, the 1993 reform, and the data.
Section 3 lays out our RD design and discusses threats to identiﬁcation. In Section
4, we present the ﬁrst stage estimates for parents. Sections 5 and 6 present our
5Two related papers use a bounds analysis. Pepper (2000) ﬁnds large conﬁdence intervals, while
De Haan and Schreiner (2017) bound average treatment eﬀects to be substantially below OLS and
estimates in the literature which identify local treatment eﬀects for marginal participants.
6While Dahl, Kostol, and Mogstad (DKM, 2014) also studies intergenerational DI participation,
our paper goes beyond it by (i) examining the eﬀects of a nationwide policy reform (DKM looks at
the 6.25% of all DI applicants who are initially denied but then appeal), (ii) following children for
21 years by which time participation reaches 10% (versus 5 years in DKM's baseline sample with
3% participation), (iii) estimating a broader set of labor market, public assistance, and education
outcomes (DKM focuses on the binary participation margin due to a lack of precision for other
outcomes), and (iv) calculating the total ﬁscal costs to the government budget, including changes in
DI payments, other transfers, and taxes. Moreover, our paper contributes to a better understanding
of intergenerational patterns in DI use by (v) exploiting variation which forces individuals oﬀ of DI
or reduces their beneﬁts (DKM uses variation which denies or delays entry into DI), and (vi) using
a completely diﬀerent quasi-experimental research design and a diﬀerent country.
7See Chen, Osberg, and Phipps (2015), Chetty, Hendren, and Katz (2016), Dahl and Lochner
(2012), Katz, Kling, and Liebman (2001), Milligan and Stabile (2011), Oreopoulos (2003), Oreopou-
los, Page, and Stevens (2008), Rege, Telle, and Votruba (2011), and Stevens and Schaller (2011).
8For a sampling, see Autor et al. (2016), Bound and Burkhauser (1999), Chen and van der
Klaauw (2008), Campolieti and Riddell (2012), de Jong, Lindeboom, and van der Klaauw (2011),
Deshpande (2016), French and Song (2014), Gruber and Kubik (1997), Kostol and Mogstad (2014),
Maestas, Mullen, and Strand (2013), and von Wachter, Song, and Manchester (2011).
5
main results on child spillovers in program participation, work, and education and
discusses the resulting ﬁscal implications. Section 7 conducts some heterogeneity and
robustness analyses and compares our results to OLS. Section 8 concludes.
2 Background and Data
2.1 Disability Insurance in the Netherlands
The modern Dutch DI program was created in 1967 by merging two existing programs
covering workplace-induced injuries and disabilities unrelated to employment. The
program was generous compared to other countries, as it covered all workers with
no waiting period, replaced up to 80% of wages, and included a variety of subjective
illnesses. Moreover, sickness beneﬁts replaced a worker's wages between 80 and 100%
during the transition to disability insurance, and workers on sickness beneﬁts for a
full year were routinely transferred to the DI program without a serious reappraisal
of their disability (Kalwij, de Vos, and Kapteyn, 2014). These factors fueled a rapid
rise in DI recipients, from 4% participation of the eligible population in 1967 to over
8% by 1980. Modest reforms in the early 1980s were enacted in an attempt to stem
the rise, but were largely ineﬀective. Participation reached a peak of 12% in the late
1980s, with payments ballooning to 4.2% of gross domestic product.
Starting in the 1990s, a series of reforms were implemented to control the spiral-
ing costs of the DI system, including reductions in beneﬁt levels, tightened eligibility
criteria, changes to the sickness beneﬁt program, and increased ﬁnancing and respon-
sibility transferred to individual employers. The cumulative eﬀect of these reforms
was that by 2012 the participation rate had fallen to just over 7% of the eligible pop-
ulation. Going forward, the participation rate is predicted to fall even further as the
stock of older recipients transitions out of the DI program and on to the retirement
pension program. The trends over time are documented in Figure 1 and discussed in
more detail by Koning and Lindeboom (2015).
The current state of DI in the Netherlands is that payments now total around 2.1%
of GDP (as of 2016). This compares to 2.3% in other European countries, and 1.7%
in the U.S. In terms of participation, the 2012 Dutch rate of 7% is higher compared
the U.S. rate of 5%, but lower than Norway's 10%, for example. One interesting
contrast is that the U.S. rate continues to rise and is projected to reach 7% by 2018
(Burkhauser and Daly, 2012), while the Dutch rate is continuing to fall. Because of
this, some have proposed adopting several aspects of the Dutch system to reverse the
steeply increasing DI trends in the U.S. (Autor, 2015).
Before continuing, we note several diﬀerences between the current Dutch and U.S.
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programs. First, in the Netherlands, individuals can receive payments for a partial
disability and therefore continue to work and earn beneﬁts simultaneously, while in the
U.S. disability determination is binary. Second, health insurance and other beneﬁts
are unrelated to DI receipt in the Netherlands, but directly linked in the U.S. Third,
beneﬁts do not depend on family size in the Netherlands, while they do in the U.S.
Fourth, the replacement rate in the Netherlands is not a function of tenure, with all
workers being covered 100% the ﬁrst day on the job. Finally, the replacement rate of
70% for complete disability in the Netherlands is higher than the average U.S rate of
40 to 50% (see Borghans et al., 2014; Autor and Duggan, 2003).
2.2 1993 Reform
Many changes are responsible for the reduction in DI expenditures in the Netherlands;
in this paper we take advantage of a 1993 reform which generates a discontinuity in
program generosity based on age. As this is the same cohort discontinuity used by
Borghans, Gielen, and Luttmer (2014) to study beneﬁt substitution, we only brieﬂy
explain the most salient features of DI in the Netherlands and the 1993 reform, and
refer readers to their paper for further details.
In the Netherlands, individuals receive DI payments based on the degree of their
disability, which is based on the calculated income loss due to a disability. Calculated
income loss is determined by comparing pre-disability earnings to a constructed mea-
sure of earnings capacity. The reform that we exploit aﬀected the calculation of this
earnings capacity, making it less generous to both current and new DI claimants.
The degree of disability is denoted in 8 categories; which category an individual
belongs to is determined by the ratio of pre-disability earnings minus earnings capacity
to pre-disability earnings. Individuals can continue to work and earn up to their
remaining earnings capacity (pre-disability earnings minus earnings capacity) after a
disability, and at the same time receive DI payments for the fraction of lost earnings.9
To explain the cohort discontinuity, we ﬁrst need to describe how earnings capac-
ity and beneﬁts were determined before and after the 1993 reform. Prior to 1993,
a medical doctor examined applicants and created a subjective list of work activi-
ties the applicant could still perform, based on a set of 27 physical activities (e.g.,
lifting, kneeling) and 10 psychological abilities (e.g., the ability to work under time
pressure). This work activity list, in conjunction with the applicant's education level,
9Pre-disability annual earnings are indexed and subject to a cap (roughly 36,000 euro in 1999).
If individuals earn more than their capped earnings exemption, their DI beneﬁts are reduced tem-
porarily, with a reclassiﬁcation of the degree of disability only happening if an individual exceeds
the cap for three years.
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was used to create a list of suitable occupations from a dictionary of occupational
requirements. The applicant's earnings capacity was then deﬁned as the average wage
in the 5 highest-paying suitable occupations which had at least 10 active workers in
the applicant's geographic region. If 5 suitable occupations could not be found, earn-
ings capacity was set to 0. The calculated degree of disability was then binned into
categories which determined the replacement rate. Replacement rates varied from 0
to 70% of prior earnings.10
The 1993 reform altered this process in two ways. First, it mandated the doctor
create a list of work activities based on a more objective medical diagnosis which
could be directly linked to functional work limitations. Second, (i) the list of suitable
occupations was expanded by no longer taking education level into account, (ii) only 3
suitable occupations were used to calculate earnings capacity, and (iii) the geographic
region of 10 active workers was expanded to be roughly three times larger. Each of
these changes weakly reduce the degree of disability for an applicant compared to
the old criteria, as remaining earnings capacity can only rise. Moreover, the new
rules make it more likely that enough suitable occupations can be found, reducing
the chances of total disability. The end result is that fewer individuals qualify for DI
and beneﬁt levels are weakly reduced for those who continue to qualify, as long their
disability has not gotten worse since their last re-examination.
A feature of the 1993 reform is that it speciﬁed all individuals age 50 or older
at the time of the reform would be subject to the old rules and not re-examined at
all. For individuals below age 50 as of January 8, 1993, the new rules aﬀected both
new applicants and existing DI participants. Since it was not logistically feasible to
re-examine all DI participants immediately, they were scheduled to be re-examined
over the ensuing years based on their age cohort, starting with the youngest cohorts
under the age of 35 on August 1, 1993. The 35 to 40 year old cohort was scheduled
to be re-examined in 1995, the 41-45 year old cohort between 1996-1997, and the
45-50 year old cohort between 1997-2001. However, on November 12, 1996 the Dutch
Parliament passed a motion grandfathering the 45-50 year age group into the old,
more generous rules. This grandfathering creates a sharp cutoﬀ in the generosity of
DI based on an individual's age, a feature we exploit for identiﬁcation.
10For a degree of disability between 80-100% the replacement rate is 70%, for 65-80% it is 50.75%,
for 55-65% it is 42%, for 45-55% it is 35%, for 35-45% it is 28%, for 25-35% it is 21%, for 15-25% it
is 14%, and for less than 15% it is 0%.
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2.3 Data
Our analysis uses several data sources that we can link through a unique identiﬁer
assigned to all individuals in the Netherlands. We combine administrative data from
several sources on the universe of children of DI recipients for the time period we
study. The disability administrative records begin in 1996 and are observed as late
as 2014. The records include information on the start and end dates of a spell, the
binned disability rating, DI payments received, pre-disability earnings, and the reason
a spell ends. The records do not contain the medical doctor's diagnosis, the list of
work activities the individual could still perform, or the set of suitable occupations.
We merge in data from a variety of administrative records for the period 1999 to
2014. We use data from Statistics Netherlands for earnings, self-employment, and
unemployment insurance which is compiled using information from three diﬀerent
tax and social insurance record sources. This data starts in 1999. Unemployment
insurance in the Netherlands can last up to 5 years depending on prior work history.
Data on general assistance (traditional cash welfare) and miscellaneous beneﬁt
programs come from the various organizations that administer the programs. As
opposed to the U.S., general assistance has no time limit in the Netherlands and
does not require dependents, although it is means tested. There are a variety of
miscellaneous beneﬁt programs during our time period, most of which are small in
terms of beneﬁt amounts and the size of the eligible population. This information
comes from the Polisadministratie register, which is used to determine eligibility
and beneﬁt amounts for all Dutch social insurance programs.
We further merge in educational attainment as of 2014, as well as family structure
in 2014. The education data is complete for younger cohorts, but comprises only a
sample for older cohorts. Crime data on arrests and incarcerations come from two
diﬀerent data sources, and both span 2005-2014. Finally, we use municipal registry
ﬁles for basic demographics. One advantage of this rich dataset merged from several
sources is that we can study a variety of spillover eﬀects across generations. Further
details on most of these variables, and how they are measured, can be found in
Appendix B of Borghans, Gielen, and Luttmer (2014).
Our data window focuses on parents who were between the ages of 40 and 50 and
on DI as of the reform date of August 1, 1993. Due to data availability, our sample is
limited to children of parents who were receiving DI beneﬁts on August 1, 1993 and
who were still on DI in 1995. It is important to realize this sample limitation should
not create any biases. The reason is that 1995 is still before the DI re-examinations
took place for the age 40-45 cohort and before the passage of the DI rule change
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exempting the age 45-50 cohort. Starting with 1995 aﬀects the interpretation of our
estimates, but not their validity. We also require the child to be living at home
around the time of the reform and to be at least 25 by 2014; as an extra speciﬁcation,
we estimate eﬀects for children not living at home at the time of the reform date.
After imposing these restrictions, we have a sample of 116,356 children.11 For the
education analyses, our sample is smaller (N=79,924) since education was collected
for all individuals in later cohorts, but only a subsample of earlier cohorts.
Summary statistics for both parents and children can be found in Appendix Table
A1. The ﬁrst column displays sample means for parents who were between the ages
of 40 to 50 and on DI as of the cutoﬀ date, and still on DI as of 1995. The other
two columns show means for subsamples on each side of the 45 year-old age cutoﬀ.
On average, parents have been on DI for almost 7.5 years as of the reform cutoﬀ
date, with the older sample having approximately an extra half year of participation.
Fifty-eight percent of parents are classiﬁed as fully disabled. Older parents are 10
percentage points more likely to be fully disabled, while younger parents have higher
rates of low-level disability. Parents in our sample are predominantly male, married,
and native Dutch.
Turning to the children, their average age is 15.6 as of the reform date. Appendix
Figure A1 graphs the distribution of child ages separately for parents on each side
of the age cutoﬀ. There is substantial overlap in the two distributions. The fact
that we have a sample of somewhat older children is due to two factors related to our
sampling frame. First, few parents between the ages of 40 and 50 have young children,
as fertility is highest when individuals are in their twenties and early thirties. Second,
children in the Netherlands commonly live with their parents during their early years
in the labor market and while attending college.
3 Model and Identiﬁcation
3.1 Regression Discontinuity Design
The discontinuity we exploit arises from the fact that the reform aﬀected some DI
participants, but not others, based on their age. Parents who were age 45 to 50 as
of August 1, 1993 were subject to the old DI rules, while parents between the the
ages of 40 to 45 were re-examined according to the new, more stringent rules. The
11We drop parents of Turkish and Moroccan origin, as birthdate is often incorrectly registered for
these individuals, and parents from the East Indies, as immigration rules were changing over time.
We further drop children whose mother was less than age 18 at the time of their birth, children with
missing covariates, and children with two parents on DI where one parent is treated and the other
is not (we include children with two parents on DI if both parents have the same treatment status).
10
direct eﬀect of the reform on parental outcome yP can be modeled in a regression
discontinuity (RD) framework as:
yPi = α
P + 1[tPi ≥ c](gl(tPi − c) + θ) + 1[tPi < c]gr(c− tPi ) + δPxi + ePi (1)
where tP is the age of the parent on August 1, 1993, c is the cut-oﬀ age of 45, x is a
vector of pre-determined parental and child characteristics, eP is an error term, and
gl, and gr are unknown functions. The coeﬃcient θ is the ﬁrst stage coeﬃcient for the
associated parental outcome (DI payment amount, or alternatively, DI participation).
The reduced form model for our RD design can be implemented as:
yCi = α
C + 1[tPi ≥ c](hl(tPi − c) + λ) + 1[tPi < c]hr(c− tPi ) + δCxi + eCi (2)
where yC is the relevant child outcome variable, x is a vector of pre-determined
parental and child characteristics, eC is an error term, and hl, and hg are unknown
functions. The coeﬃcient λ is the reduced form (RF) or intention to treat (ITT)
eﬀect of the reform on outcomes. In the absence of covariates, the IV estimate is
simply the ratio of the RF estimate of λ to the relevant ﬁrst stage estimate of θ.
3.2 Threats to Identiﬁcation
Manipulation. The validity of an RD design requires that individuals cannot manip-
ulate the assignment variable, which in our setting is the parent's age at the time of
the reform. Since parents cannot change their actual or oﬃcially recorded age easily
in the Netherlands, there is little chance for this type of direct manipulation.
Since the DI data is not available until 1995, a similar threat to validity is that
the reform caused diﬀerential attrition around the age 45 cutoﬀ. As a reminder,
our sample includes parents who were receiving DI beneﬁts on August 1, 1993 (the
date the reform went into eﬀect for new applicants and the youngest cohort of existing
claimants) and who were were still on DI in 1995. In other words, we can only observe
whether an individual was receiving DI at the time of the initial implementation of
the reform if they remained on DI until 1995. While the reform likely caused some
claimants to exit DI in anticipation that they would be re-examined, it is unlikely
to have caused a jump in exits around the age 45 cutoﬀ. The reason is the re-
examinations for individuals age 40-45 did not start until after 1995 and it was not
until November 1996 that Parliament decided the 45-50 year old cohort would be
grandfathered in to the old, more generous rules.12
Borghans et al. (2014) perform two empirical tests for manipulation for their
12While 40 year olds were initially scheduled to be re-examined at the end of 1995, the re-
examinations took longer than initially expected. In conversations with the disability insurance
oﬃce, we learned that few 40 year olds were re-examined before 1996.
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sample, which includes all individuals on DI, and not just parents. They ﬁrst graph
the histogram of age at the time of the reform, and ﬁnd no noticeable jumps around
the age 45 cutoﬀ. We ﬁnd a similar result for our sample of parents: using a McCrary
(2008) test, we do not reject the null hypothesis of a smooth density around the 45
year old cutoﬀ (p-value=0.25). Second, they ﬁnd no systematic evidence of changes
in the distribution of pre-determined characteristics around the reform date. Using
our sample of parents, we similarly ﬁnd that almost all of the pre-determined char-
acteristics do not jump signiﬁcantly at the 45 year old cutoﬀ. Moreover, the point
estimates are small in magnitude and our RD estimates barely move when we include
these characteristics in the regressions.
Exclusion Restriction. As long as parents cannot manipulate their age and there
is no diﬀerential attrition around the age cutoﬀ, the RD design will identify the
ITT eﬀects for children. That is, we can estimate the causal impacts on children of
the 1993 DI reform which tightened DI generosity for some parents but not others.
To scale these reduced form eﬀects, we will be using parental DI payments as the
ﬁrst stage outcome. Interpreting the resulting IV estimates as the causal eﬀect of
a drop in parental DI payments requires an exclusion restriction: whether a parent
was exposed to the 1993 reform should aﬀect their child's outcomes only through the
drop in parental DI payments, and not directly in any other way.
The drop in DI payments may not be a suﬃcient statistic for how the program
changes aﬀected children. For parents remaining on the program, the reform (weakly)
decreased DI payments, whereas for parents kicked oﬀ DI or choosing to leave volun-
tarily, the reform reduced their payment to zero. Parental DI payments will capture
both the intensive and extensive margins of the reform under the assumption that
total DI payments are what matters. For the exclusion restriction to hold, therefore,
parental participation versus non-participation cannot directly aﬀect children except
through the reduction in payments to zero. This implies, for example, that a parental
reduction in beneﬁts from 10,000 to 7,000 euros has the same eﬀect as a parent who
previously received 3,000 euros exiting the program and receiving 0 euros. Since this
may not be the correct functional form for how the new stricter rules aﬀected children,
we focus more on the reduced form estimates throughout.
The 1993 reform may also have triggered a variety of changes for exposed parents,
such as changes in parental labor supply, available family income, or even family
structure. It is important to note these changes do not violate the exclusion restric-
tion. Instead, they are potential mechanisms through which a shock to parental DI
generosity aﬀects children.
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Monotonicity. If the eﬀect of the drop in parental DI payments is constant for each
child outcome, then the absence of manipulation combined with the exclusion restric-
tion are suﬃcient for consistent IV estimation. With heterogeneous eﬀects, however,
monotonicity is also needed. In our setting, monotonicity requires that if a parent was
exposed to the new, more stringent DI rules, they must receive DI payments which
are lower or the same compared to what they would have received under the old rules.
Monotonicity ensures that IV identiﬁes the local average treatment eﬀect (LATE) of
a drop in parental DI payments, that is, the average eﬀect among the subgroup of
children whose parent's DI payments would have been lowered if they were exposed
to the new versus old rules.
Since the new rules weakly reduced payments for any individual whose situation
has not changed, monotonicity holds by construction for most of the sample. The one
exception is that if a parent's illness has worsened, re-examination under the new,
stricter rules could still result in a higher degree of disability classiﬁcation (and hence
a higher DI payment). Comparing the 40-45 age cohort, which was exposed to the
stricter rules, with the 45-50 age cohort reveals this is unlikely to be an important
issue. For the 40-45 age cohort, 5.8% of the sample had their degree of disability rating
increase between 1996 and 1999, whereas for the 45-50 age cohort, 6.6% had their
rating increase. This comparison indicates that any margin for non-monotonicity to
matter is small, even taking into account that rating increases are expected to occur
somewhat more often for older individuals.
4 First Stage Parental Estimates
This section documents the eﬀect of the reform on parents using an RD design. An
advantage of RD is that results can be presented graphically, which provides a trans-
parent way of showing how the intergenerational spillovers are identiﬁed. Throughout
the paper, we will begin with a graphical depiction of key outcomes before turning
to a more detailed regression-based analysis. The ﬁgures will include outcomes ag-
gregated into parental age bins, as well as separate linear trends on each side of the
cutoﬀ estimated using the underlying data and baseline regression speciﬁcation. The
regression lines best illustrate the trends in the data and the size of the jump, whereas
the binned means provide a sense of the underlying variability in the data.
The top panel of Figure 2 graphs the relationship between parental DI payments
and the reform. The sample is comprised of parents who were already receiving DI
beneﬁts before the reform. The running variable is the parent's age as of the reform
date of August 1, 1993 and the cutoﬀ age of 45 years old determines whether the
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parent is subject to the new versus old DI program rules. On the y-axis is parental
DI beneﬁts in 1999; we use 1999 since this is after all the re-examinations have taken
place. Our age variable is recorded at the monthly level; each observation in the
graph is the average DI payment for parents in six-month age bins. Three-month age
bins for this graph, and all other RD graphs, can be found in the Appendix.
The ﬁgure reveals that DI beneﬁt payments rise with age, largely reﬂecting the
fact that older individuals have higher degree of disability ratings on average and
therefore higher DI payments. More importantly, there is a sharp drop in payments
for individuals just to the left of the cutoﬀ. This is as expected, since parents less
than age 45 were subject to the stricter DI program rules. DI payments drop by
around 1,300 euros, which is a reduction of 13% compared to the average.
To document the extensive margin of the DI reform by itself, in the bottom panel
we graph the fraction of parents who exit DI completely. The running variable and
cutoﬀ are the same as in the top panel. Each observation in the graph is the fraction
of parents in a six-month bin who have exited DI by 1999. The ﬁrst pattern to notice
is that exits decrease with age. More relevant for our RD design, at the cutoﬀ there
is a sizable 5 percentage point increase in exits for parents exposed to the reform,
which is roughly a 60% higher exit rate than otherwise would be predicted.
In Table 1 we present regression results corresponding to these ﬁgures. Our
baseline speciﬁcation, here and in what follows, regresses the relevant outcome on
a dummy for the reform cutoﬀ and separate linear trends in parental age to the left
and the right of the cutoﬀ. We use triangular weights so that observations nearer the
cutoﬀ will have more inﬂuence. Although the coeﬃcients are not reported, we also
include a variety of covariates for both the parent and the child which are measured
as of January 1, 1996 and listed in the footnote to the table.13
The ﬁrst speciﬁcation in Table 1 looks at a parent's DI payments in the year 1999,
after all re-examinations have taken place. Mirroring what was drawn in the top panel
of Figure 2, the ﬁrst stage RD estimate is a sizable 1,300 euro drop in beneﬁts for
parents exposed to the reform. This ﬁrst stage point estimate is more than 13 times
its standard error. Both the size and the precision of this estimate are important for
identifying spillover eﬀects on children, which by their nature are second order eﬀects.
The second speciﬁcation uses exit from DI by 1999 as the outcome, and ﬁnds a large
and precisely estimated 5.4 percentage point drop at the cutoﬀ.
As a reminder, some individuals exposed to the reform were kicked oﬀ the program,
13January 1, 1996 is before the passage of the law exempting the 45-50 age cohort from the new,
less generous DI rules and before the re-examinations have occurred for the 40-45 age cohort, so
these controls should be exogenous to the cutoﬀ.
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while others remained on DI but with lower beneﬁts. Given the reform had both an
extensive and intensive margin, we focus primarily on the reduced form estimates
when analyzing children's outcomes. But to provide a sense of scale, we also use the
total drop in parental DI payments (including drops to zero) as a ﬁrst stage variable
to construct an IV estimate.
As a result of the reform, other parental outcomes changed as well. Borghans et
al.'s (2014) analysis ﬁnds a strong rebound in labor earnings of 0.62 euros on average
per euro of lost DI beneﬁts and a 0.30 euro substitution to other social assistance
programs in the short run. These eﬀects diminish in magnitude over time, so that
ﬁnancial resources decline in the long run. We ﬁnd similar patterns for our sample
of parents. These other eﬀects are important to keep in mind when interpreting the
child spillovers we estimate in the paper.
5 Spillovers in Program Participation and Work
5.1 Child DI Participation
We begin our investigation of intergenerational spillovers by exploring the linkage in
DI participation between parents and their children. Figure 3 presents RD graphs
for the extensive and intensive margins of DI use. The x-axes in both graphs are the
same as in Figure 2, with the running variable being the age of the parent as of the
reform date and the cutoﬀ age of 45 being marked with a vertical line. But now the
y-axis plots the child's participation in DI, rather than the parent's. Each observation
in the graph is an average for six-month age bins; three-month bins can be found in
the Appendix.
An advantage of our long panel is that we can measure outcomes when the children
are much older, after they have had a chance to live on their own, enter the labor
market, and participate in the DI program. For our main child outcomes, we measure
cumulative eﬀects as of 2014, which is 21 years after the reform cutoﬀ date. By this
time, children are 37.4 years old on average, with the range of child ages spanning
from 28 years old at the 10th percentile to 40 years old at the 90th percentile. Between
1999 and 2014, over 10% of children in our sample have participated in DI at some
point, with an average number of 298 days spent on the program (including zeros).
The top graph in Figure 3 looks at whether a child has ever participated in DI
between 1999 and 2014. There is a noticeable jump in child DI participation at the
parental age cutoﬀ of 45. Likewise, there is a noticeable jump in the cumulative
number of days a child has been on DI. Table 2 presents the reduced form estimates
corresponding to these graphs. For the extensive margin of participation, there is
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a statistically and economically signiﬁcant 1.1 percentage point drop for children if
their parent was exposed to the reform. This is an 11% eﬀect relative to the mean.
Likewise, children participate in DI for 47 fewer days if their parent was subject to
the stricter DI rules, which represents a 16% drop relative to the mean.
The table also presents IV estimates to provide a sense of scaling. We use the
total drop in parental DI payments, including drops to zero, as the ﬁrst stage outcome
variable (see panel A in Table 1).14 Applying this scaling, a parental drop of 1,000
euros results in a 0.9 percentage point lower probability a child will be on DI and 38
fewer cumulative days on DI.
To arrive at the cost savings to taxpayers from the reduced DI use of children,
in Figure 4 we plot an RD graph with the dollar amount of cumulative DI receipt
as the outcome. There is a drop of approximately 1,600 euros in cumulative child
DI beneﬁts between 1999 and 2014. As reported in Table 3, this is a sizable eﬀect
relative to the mean of 10 thousand euros in DI receipt on average (including zeros).
The IV estimate suggests that when a parent's DI beneﬁts fall by a thousand euros
in 1999, a child's cumulative DI income is roughly 1,300 euros lower.
5.2 Other Government Transfer Programs
We next look at other government transfer programs. This is important, because if
children are simply shifting from one social assistance program to another, the cost
savings to the government from children's reduced DI use will be overstated. Indeed,
Borghans et al. (2014) document that while the reform lowered DI participation
and beneﬁts for those directly aﬀected, a sizable portion of this loss was replaced by
increased participation in other social assistance programs in the short run. Similar
program substitution occurs for the directly aﬀected parents in our sample as well.
With this motivation in mind, we pool together all of the miscellaneous beneﬁt
programs (besides DI) which are part of the social safety net in the Netherlands, and
see if a child's receipt of these other beneﬁts is aﬀected by having a parent subject to
the harsher DI rules. The bottom graph in Figure 4 reveals no noticeable change in
other beneﬁt receipt at the cutoﬀ. Table 3 conﬁrms that the point estimate is small
and statistically insigniﬁcant. The table breaks things down further by separately
reporting RD estimates for UI income, general assistance (traditional cash welfare),
and the remaining miscellaneous beneﬁt programs. For each type of beneﬁt category,
the estimates are small and insigniﬁcant.
These results stand in stark contrast to those of their parents, who themselves
14Note that the IV estimates will have the opposite sign compared to the reduced form, as the
ﬁrst stage estimate is negative.
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had substantial substitution to these other programs in the short run (in particular
to the UI program). This means that a parent's increased reliance on these other
transfer programs, including any accrued knowledge and experience, did not transfer
to their children. Any learning and spillover eﬀects are apparently linked to the DI
program itself. The conclusion is that the cost savings from the next generation due
to lower DI use is not oﬀset by increased participation in other programs.
5.3 Labor Market Earnings and Taxes Paid
We now turn to labor market earnings and taxes paid by children. The top panel
of Figure 5 plots the cumulative earnings of children for the 15 year period from
1999 to 2014. Cumulative earnings includes wage income as well as income from self
employment. In this graph, we plot the residuals from a regression of child earnings
on child age. The reason to plot residuals is that children's cumulative earnings have
a steep own-age proﬁle and child age increases on average with their parent's age as
of the reform date. This makes the range of the y-axis so wide with raw data that it
is diﬃcult to zoom in on the RD jump at the cutoﬀ. We note that while child age
is positively correlated with parent age, this should not be a problem, as child age
appears to be smooth through the RD cutoﬀ.15
The top ﬁgure shows a jump in cumulative child earnings at the parental age cutoﬀ.
Turning to Table 4, the RD estimate is an increase of a little over 7 thousand euros
in earnings for children whose parents were subject to the reform. This is roughly
a 2% increase in earnings relative to the overall mean. Stated somewhat diﬀerently,
the IV scaling suggests that for each 1,000 euro drop in parental DI beneﬁts due to
the reform, children's cumulative earnings increase by around 5,700 euros.
While earnings changes are inherently interesting, what matters for the govern-
ment's balance sheet is taxes minus transfers. We therefore calculate predicted taxes
for children from 1999 to 2014.16 The bottom graph of Figure 5 plots child cumula-
tive child tax payments versus the running variable of parental age. As we did for
earnings, we ﬁrst regress out a child's age for this graph. Table 4 documents a large
and statistically signiﬁcant reduced form eﬀect on taxes: estimated taxes paid rise by
two thousand euros, which is a little under 2% of the mean. The IV estimate which
15Using child age as the outcome variable, and parent's age as the running variable, yields a small,
and statistically insigniﬁcant jump of -.044 (s.e.=.066) at the cutoﬀ.
16We calculate taxes using the relevant tax brackets for each year. We allow individuals to carry
losses backward and forward, as speciﬁed by the Dutch tax code. The rules specify that losses are
ﬁrst used to oﬀset positive income in the last three years, with further losses being carried forward
for up to nine years. Since our income data begins in 1999, we are limited in applying carrybackward
losses until 2002. As an alternative, we also tried using a variable which ignored the ability to oﬀset
losses. The results using this alternative tax measure are similar.
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provides a scaling is also sizable, but loses statistical signiﬁcance at the 10 percent
conﬁdence level.
5.4 Cumulative Fiscal Eﬀects
To provide a comprehensive picture of the ﬁscal spillover eﬀects, we now estimate
the cumulative change in taxes minus transfers up through 2014. Policy makers
should ultimately be concerned with this net eﬀect, since this is what matters for the
government's budget. To do this, we create a variable which combines DI and all
other government transfer program payments and subtracts this from taxes paid by a
child. As shown in Table 4, we ﬁnd that taxes minus transfers increase by 3,483 euros
(s.e.=1,271) for children of parents who were subject to the stricter DI rules. The
scaling provided by our IV estimate implies that for each 1,000 euro drop in parental
DI beneﬁts around the time of the reform, the government's budget improved by
almost 2,800 euro per child by 2014.
To provide further insight into the ﬁscal eﬀects over time, Figure 6 plots year-
by-year RD estimates for cumulative DI beneﬁts, cumulative other transfers, and
cumulative tax payments over time. There is a small, but statistically signiﬁcant
savings in DI payments in the ﬁrst ﬁve years, and this eﬀect grows larger over time.
In contrast, other cumulative transfers are close to zero and insigniﬁcant for the entire
period. Cumulative tax payments, plotted in the upper left graph, start out small
and rise little in the ﬁrst 5 years. This makes sense, as many of the children are still
in school and have not yet begun working full time in the early years of our data.
But the increase in estimated tax payments rises with time, so that by 2006 the eﬀect
becomes statistically signiﬁcant.
The lower right panel in Figure 6 plots the net eﬀect of taxes minus transfers over
time. It mirrors the reduction in DI payments and the rise in tax payments over
time, as expected. It is interesting to note that by 2014, increased taxes account for a
slightly larger fraction of the net savings to the government's budget compared to the
reduction in DI payments. This highlights the limitation of looking at DI in isolation,
without considering other possible ﬁscal spillovers.
5.5 Budget Savings from Children versus Parents
To gauge the importance of child spillovers, we compare the budget savings of the re-
form, including all transfers and taxes, due to children versus their parents. Borghans
et al. (2014) estimate direct eﬀects on parents from 1999 to 2005. We extend their
analysis to calculate a measure of the cumulative ﬁscal costs for parents until manda-
tory retirement at age 65, which occurs in 2013 for parents at the reform cutoﬀ.
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Mandatory retirement complicates this calculation, as once parents within the esti-
mation window start reaching age 65, we can no longer use an RD design. This is
because parents over age 65 are no longer eligible for DI beneﬁts and instead auto-
matically begin to collect their government provided pension (which is a ﬁxed amount
and does not depend on work history).
To deal with this, we estimate the cumulative ﬁscal eﬀects using an RD design for
each year from 1999 to 2008, before any parents in our estimation window reach age
65. It turns out the increase in cumulative net taxes minus all transfers is remarkably
linear in years; a regression of the estimated RD coeﬃcients on a year trend has a
slope coeﬃcient of 1,167.7 euros (s.e.=21.4) and an R-squared of 0.997. We then
extrapolate this linear trend for the years 2009 to 2013. Assuming a discount rate
of 3% per year, we calculate a PDV budgetary savings of 12,999 euros per parent
exposed to the reform up through 2013. Using the RD estimates for children from
Figure 6, we calculate a PDV budgetary savings of 3,485 euros from children per
exposed parent (taking into account that some parents have more than one child).17
These calculations imply the child spillover eﬀects account for 21% of the ﬁscal
beneﬁts of the reform by 2013. This is likely an underestimate going forward in
time, however. This is because while the parents are no longer eligible to work or
participate in DI, their children have an average of 30 years of DI eligibility and
work life remaining. Extrapolating the estimated child spillovers beyond 2013, we
calculate that 40% of the present discounted value of the savings in the long run is
due to children.18
Projections about future DI use and taxes paid by both parents and children
should be viewed as suggestive, in part because the economic and policy environment
is likely to change over time.19 But the basic point remains: ﬁscal spillovers from the
next generation are nontrivial, and ignoring their eﬀects greatly understates the cost
savings of the reform in the long run.
17All ﬁgures are indexed to be in 2014 euros.
18We use a linear extrapolation based on the RD estimates for taxes minus transfers for 2005-2014.
We exclude 1999-2004, since the lower right panel of Figure 6 reveals a diﬀerent trend when children
are ﬁnishing school and beginning their work life. A regression of the estimated RD coeﬃcients on
a year trend has a slope coeﬃcient of 255.6 euros (s.e.=7.8) and an R-squared of 0.992.
19These rough estimates also do not include the public costs associated with the increased educa-
tion we document in the next section.
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6 Spillovers in Education and Possible Mechanisms
6.1 Educational Investments
So far, we have examined how parents inﬂuence their children's participation in DI,
other government beneﬁt programs, and earnings from work. These child outcomes
mostly occur in the future, after a child has grown up and entered the labor market.
Is it possible that children anticipate this lower reliance on DI and increased labor
market attachment in the future, and make diﬀerent investment choices while they
are still young?
One way to get at this question is to see if children increase their educational
investments in response to having a parent exposed to the harsher DI rules. We
collected data on children's educational attainment as of 2014.20 In Figure 7, the top
graph plots child years of education against the running variable of the parent's age
as of the reform date. While most children will be done with their formal education
by 2014, not all are. Indeed, one can see in the ﬁgure that education trends slightly
upward in the graph as a function of parental age, which is correlated with child
age. Table 5 reports the corresponding RF estimate and standard error for years of
education. There is a signiﬁcant jump at the reform cutoﬀ, with children of reform-
exposed parents getting 0.12 years more education, relative to a mean of 11.5 years.
The IV estimate suggests that a one thousand euro loss in parental beneﬁts results
in an increase of roughly one tenth of a year of education.
The bottom panel in Figure 7 plots the RD graph with upper secondary school
completion (roughly the equivalent of High School) as the outcome variable. There
is a signiﬁcant jump of 2.2 percentage points at the reform cutoﬀ, as documented in
Table 5. This is a modestly sized, but economically signiﬁcant, eﬀect relative to the
overall mean of 78 percent.
Table 5 further reports RD estimates for other levels of schooling.21 We ﬁnd
no eﬀect of a parent's exposure to the DI reform on their children's completion of
lower secondary school. This is as expected, since most children are too old to be
aﬀected, and most children complete this minimal level of schooling anyway due to
compulsory schooling laws. In contrast, children of reform-exposed parents are not
only more likely to complete upper secondary school, but they are also more likely to
obtain higher education. This could be in part because admittance to college requires
20The sample size is somewhat smaller than for the analyses in Section 5, because for earlier
cohorts, education is only available for a subsample of observations.
21As background, from the ages of 4 or 5 to 12 or 13, children attend elementary school. Further
education in secondary school is split into three tracks, and takes an additional 4 to 6 years depending
on whether the student enrolls in a vocational or college preparatory program.
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completion of upper secondary school.
These results are intriguing, because they provide some of the ﬁrst well-identiﬁed
and precisely estimated evidence documenting anticipatory investments by children
as a result of parental program participation. These higher levels of educational
investment have the potential to increase future earnings, lower unemployment spells,
and hence increase government tax revenue.
6.2 Other Outcomes: Crime and Marriage
We brieﬂy explore spillovers for two other sets of outcomes. We start by looking at
whether children's crime is aﬀected, since the opportunity cost of committing crime
should rise as children work and earn more in the formal labor market. As Appendix
Table A2 documents, we ﬁnd a reduction in the chances a child is incarcerated if their
parent was exposed to the reform. There is a statistically signiﬁcant 0.3 percentage
point drop in incarceration relative to an overall mean of 1.8%, or a 16% reduction.
However, we ﬁnd no signiﬁcant evidence for a decline in arrests.
Marriage could also be aﬀected by a parent's DI use, as children with higher earn-
ings and extra education should be more attractive marriage partners. We ﬁnd some
evidence that having a parent whose DI beneﬁts are reduced increases the probability
a child will get married. There is a 1.1 percentage point increase in marriage, relative
to a base of 46%, for children of reform-exposed parents. In contrast, cohabitation
which includes a child in the relationship goes the other direction, although it is not
statistically signiﬁcant. Insofar as marriage represents a more stable type of union
compared to cohabitation, these are potentially positive spillovers.
6.3 Possible Mechanisms
Before continuing, we consider several explanations for our ﬁndings. We start by rul-
ing out two possibilities which have been hypothesized as reasons for intergenerational
program participation. It cannot be information about how to apply for the program,
as all parents have been through the DI screening process. Similarly, reductions in
stigma from observing a parent participate seems improbable, as parents have already
been on DI for a long time prior to the reform (almost 7.5 years on average). While
such learning and stigma channels may be important in other contexts, they play at
most a minor role here.
Understanding how the new DI policy aﬀected parents is key for interpreting the
intergenerational eﬀects. As a result of the reform, parental leisure decreased and
work hours increased on average, with total parental income changing little in the
short run but declining in the long run. In theory, less parental supervision due
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to increased work hours or lower income in the long run could result in reduced
investments in children, harming their attachment to the labor force as adults. Based
on our estimates, this is not the case, with the ﬁndings all pointing to a greater focus
by children on future employment.
Instead, the two explanations most consistent with our ﬁndings are that children
experience a scarring eﬀect or learn about formal employment. The scarring mecha-
nism we have in mind is that when a child observes a parent being forced oﬀ of DI or
having their DI payment cut, the child infers they cannot rely on the government to
take care of them in the future. This is similar to the scarring eﬀect talked about in
Malmendier and Nagel (2011) in the context of macroeconomic shocks and future risk
taking. The learning mechanism is that aﬀected parents transmit information about
the labor market or provide a positive role model due to their increased employment.
While we cannot test these two explanations directly, both can explain why children
of treated parents increase their educational investments when young, earn more in
the labor market as adults, and decrease their future DI use.22
7 Heterogeneity, Robustness, Placebo Tests, and OLS
7.1 Eﬀects by Child Age
To better understand the intergenerational spillovers just documented, in this section
we break up the estimated eﬀects by child age as of November 1996. The reason to
focus on child age as of this date is that it is when the Dutch Parliament decided
the 45-50 year old cohort would be grandfathered in under the old DI rules. It is
also the approximate time when the re-examinations for the 40-45 year old cohort
began, and hence when children began to be diﬀerentially aﬀected by the reform. We
split children into two roughly equally-sized groups: those who are 18 and younger
versus 19 and older as of November 1996.23 While it would be interesting to also look
at even younger age splits, the sample of parents around the reform cutoﬀ are old
enough that they do not have many young children.
Table 6 reports separate RD estimates for our main outcomes split by child age.
Looking at the DI spillovers in speciﬁcations A through C, the eﬀects are all large
and statistically signiﬁcant for the younger group. The estimated eﬀects for the older
group, while going in the same direction, are smaller.
22Interestingly, we ﬁnd no evidence that children participate more in other safety net programs,
like unemployment insurance, even though their parent's use rises modestly. One explanation is that
the increased focus on future employment dominates any eﬀects from these other programs.
23As a reminder, we limit our sample to children still living at home at the time of the reform
announcement, including children living at home while attending college.
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For other social programs besides DI, we ﬁnd no eﬀect for either age group. But
when we turn to earnings, we ﬁnd relatively large and marginally signiﬁcant eﬀects
for the older group. These increased earnings also translate into higher taxes paid,
although the estimate is not statistically signiﬁcant at conventional levels. For the
younger group, the eﬀects are the same sign, but smaller. This apparent puzzle, given
the opposite pattern found for DI participation by child age, has a simple explanation
which we return to after discussing the education outcomes.
Speciﬁcations G and H estimate the spillover eﬀects on child education. The IV
estimate for the younger group implies an increase of 0.16 years of schooling for each
thousand dollar reduction in parental DI beneﬁts. In contrast, there is no statistically
signiﬁcant spillover in years of education for those age 19 and older. Looking at upper
secondary school completion, we again ﬁnd larger eﬀects for the younger age group.
Upper secondary school is usually completed by age 18 or 19, so for the older group,
there is less time to aﬀect this schooling margin.24
How do all of these results ﬁt together, particularly the stronger DI eﬀect for
the younger group and the larger earnings eﬀect for the older group? First, it is
important to recognize that because of their age, the older group has had over three
more prime-age years to work in the labor market; indeed, mean cumulative earnings
for the older group are 50% higher. On top of this, the younger group gets more
education, which delays the start of their prime earnings years. Accounting for this
education-induced absence from the workforce can more than explain the diﬀerence
in the earnings eﬀects found for the two age groups.25 Education-induced absences
from the workforce can also help explain the stronger DI result for younger children,
as individuals cannot be enrolled full time in school and concurrently on DI.
In summary, the pattern of results in Table 6 indicates that younger children are
more strongly aﬀected by their parents. A natural set of explanations is that younger
children are more impressionable, have a longer period to observe their parent's DI
experiences, and have more time to alter their educational plans.
24A small number of children complete their education at older ages if they are either on a 6 year
educational track or have previously repeated a grade.
25To make a comparison, we concentrate on the IV estimates to account for the diﬀerences in
parental ﬁrst stages. Treated children in the younger group receive an extra 0.162 years of education
for each thousand dollar reduction in parental DI, compared to 0.045 for the older group. A reason-
able estimate of earnings in prime age years can be taken from the diﬀerence in average cumulative
earnings for the two groups (448,788-290,500 euros) divided by the average age diﬀerence between
the groups (3.41 years). Assuming individuals do not work while in school, this implies a loss of
5,431 in earnings for treated children. Adding this to the IV estimate of -4,274 for the younger
group (speciﬁcation E) equals -9,705, which is over 70% larger in absolute value compared to the IV
estimate of -5,640 for the older group.
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7.2 Robustness
Appendix Table A3 reports a variety of speciﬁcation checks for our main outcomes.
For simplicity, the table only reports the reduced form estimates. The ﬁrst row repeats
our baseline estimates for ease of comparison. In Speciﬁcation B, we allow separate
quadratic trends on each side of the cutoﬀ; the estimates are larger, but the standard
errors also increase. The next two speciﬁcations remove the triangular weights and
the control variables from the regression, and yield similar ﬁndings to the baseline.
In speciﬁcations E and F we narrow the RD estimation window. As we shrink
the window down to 45 or 30 months on each side of the cutoﬀ, the estimates be-
come somewhat larger, but the standard errors increase as well. All estimates remain
statistically signiﬁcant (except for cumulative other transfers, which is never signif-
icant). As an alternative set of speciﬁcations, we estimate local linear regressions.
Depending on the bandwidth, some of the estimates become insigniﬁcant, but the
point estimates are broadly similar to the baseline.
In speciﬁcation J, we run a regression where the sample only includes children not
living at home at the time of the reform. This can occur if the child has moved out or
because a child does not live with their biological parent (for example, if the parent
is divorced). With this sample, we ﬁnd no signiﬁcant eﬀect for most of the outcomes.
In speciﬁcation K we cluster the standard errors by parental age and ﬁnd it makes
little diﬀerence. The ﬁnal two speciﬁcations exclude non-native Dutch and children
whose parents left DI by 1995. The RD estimates remain similar to the baseline.
7.3 Placebo Tests
To further explore the validity of our estimates, we conduct placebo tests for our
main outcomes. To do this, we collected a completely diﬀerent sample of children:
those whose parents were not on DI as of 1995. Since these parents are all subject
to the new DI examination rules (regardless of their age), they should not be treated
diﬀerentially. As a result, there should be no discontinuity at the 45 year old age
cutoﬀ. Indeed, we ﬁnd no evidence of a ﬁrst stage for this sample.
Table 7 replicates our baseline reduced form speciﬁcations for child outcomes, with
the only exception being the diﬀerent, and much larger, sample. There is no evidence
of an eﬀect for any of these outcomes, with the point estimates being uniformly small
and statistically insigniﬁcant. This provides reassurance our results are being driven
by the change in DI strictness, and not other policies which diﬀerentially aﬀected
parents at a similar age cutoﬀ.
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7.4 Comparison to OLS
As a ﬁnal exercise, we compare our quasi-experimental estimates to OLS. To construct
our OLS sample, we take all parents between the ages of 40 to 50 at the time of the
reform who have at least one child still living at home with them. This sample includes
parents who were on DI as of the reform date, but additionally includes parents who
were not on DI as of the reform date. To make sure diﬀerential re-examinations for
those under versus over the age 45 cutoﬀ do not drive our OLS estimates, we split
this sample into two groups: parents between the ages of 40 and 45, and parents
between the ages of 45 and 50. We estimate separate OLS regressions for children
whose parents are in the younger versus older parental age groups.
In Table 8, we estimate the eﬀect of parental DI beneﬁt amounts in 1996 on each
of our main child outcomes. The OLS estimates are most directly comparable to the
IV estimates shown previously, as both are measured on the same scale. The OLS
estimates for the younger versus older parent samples are generally quite similar, but
diverge sharply from the IV estimates.
The ﬁrst row in Table 8 uses whether the child was ever on DI by 2014 as the
outcome variable. The OLS estimate implies an extra 1,000 euros in parental DI pay-
ments increases a child's probability of participating in DI by 0.3 percentage points
for both the older and younger parent samples. This compares to the IV estimate
of 0.9 percentage points in Table 2. Looking at days on DI, income from DI, earn-
ings, taxes, and education, the IV estimate is similarly between 2 and 4 times larger
compared to OLS. Interestingly, the OLS estimate for cumulative total beneﬁts from
other social assistance programs is large and signiﬁcant. In contrast, the IV estimate
is close to zero.
Why are the IV estimates substantially larger in general? There are several pos-
sible explanations. First, the reasons for diﬀerential DI participation and payment
amounts are likely not the same in the two samples. For example, in the OLS sample,
if a child observes a parent is gaming the system, they may be inclined to do the
same, whereas if they see their parent is truly disabled, it may have little eﬀect on
them unless they experience the same health condition. In contrast, the IV estimate
compares parents whose job prospects and health conditions are presumably similar,
but whose DI payments change due to diﬀerential exposure to the new, stricter DI
rules. Being forced oﬀ of DI or having one's payments reduced could represent a large
shock to a parent expecting to remain on DI for the long term, and children's views
about the ability to rely on government support could change markedly in response.
A second reason is that IV estimates a local average treatment eﬀect (LATE)
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for compliers, and the intergenerational spillovers could be diﬀerent for the complier
sample compared to the general population. To better understand who the compliers
are in the RD regressions, Appendix Table A4 calculates the average characteristics
of compliers.26 The table then compares these averages to the characteristics of all
children in the OLS sample whose parents are between 44.5 and 45.5 years old as
of the reform date. The biggest diﬀerence is the degree of parental disability. Fifty-
seven percent of individuals in the OLS sample are fully disabled, while only 48% of
compliers are fully disabled. Compliers have also been on DI for a longer time period,
with durations which are 10 months longer on average.
On a related point, it is important to recognize the Dutch reform aﬀected marginal
DI participants who had more work capacity on average. The intergenerational
spillover eﬀects for these marginal cases could be quite diﬀerent compared to cases
where a parent has little or no work capacity. Fortunately, the marginal participants
we study are the most policy relevant, as they are the ones who presumably would
be targeted by most reforms.
8 Conclusion
Whether a parent's participation in a social assistance program inﬂuences their child's
use of public assistance, employment, and human capital investments is a diﬃcult
question to answer due to the nonrandom nature of program participation and the
likelihood that unobserved factors driving participation are correlated across gener-
ations. Yet the impact of parental DI participation on children's later life outcomes
could matter for the ﬁnancial stability of a variety of social insurance and safety net
programs.
To obtain causal estimates of intergenerational spillovers, this paper takes advan-
tage of a DI reform in the Netherlands combined with high quality register data.
Our results indicate that children respond strongly when a parent exits DI or has
their beneﬁts reduced. Children whose parents were exposed to the reform are less
likely to participate in DI themselves as adults, do not increase their participation in
other public assistance programs, increase their earnings and taxes paid, and invest
signiﬁcantly more in their education. Two explanations consistent with our ﬁndings
are that children experience a scarring eﬀect, inferring that they cannot rely on gov-
ernment support, and that children learn about the labor market from their parent's
increased employment.
From a policy perspective, our study serves as an important lesson for the eval-
26For details on how to calculate the complier averages, see Borghans et al. (2014).
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uation of costs and beneﬁts of social assistance programs. Considering current par-
ticipants only, without accounting for the long-run eﬀects within families, would be
a mistake. We ﬁnd that ignoring intergenerational spillovers underestimates the cost
savings of the Dutch reform by between 21 and 40 percent in the long run.
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Figure 1: DI Stocks and Inﬂows as a Percentage of Insured Workers, 1968-2016.
Notes: Data come from the Dutch Employee Insurance Agency (Uitvoeringsinstituut Werkne-
mersverzekeringen), as used in Koning and Lindeboom (2015). Estimates of the number of
insured workers are used to calculate receipt and award percentages for 2014 to 2016.
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Figure 2: Eﬀects of the Reform on Parents
Notes: Each observation represents average parental DI receipt in 1999 (top panel) or average
parental DI exit by 1999 (bottom panel) in 6 months age bins, based on the parent's age as
of the reform date of August 1993. The dashed vertical lines denote the reform cutoﬀ of
age 45. The solid trend lines are based on regressions using unbinned data, with dotted lines
indicating pointwise 90 percent conﬁdence intervals.
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Figure 3: Child DI Participation
Notes: Each observation represents average child DI participation by 2014 (top panel) or
average cumulative child days on DI by 2014 (bottom panel) in 6 months age bins, based on
the parent's age as of the reform date of August 1993. The dashed vertical lines denote the
reform cutoﬀ of age 45. The solid trend lines are based on regressions using unbinned data,
with dotted lines indicating pointwise 90 percent conﬁdence intervals.
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Figure 4: Child DI and Other Beneﬁt Receipt
Notes: See Table 3 and notes to Figure 3.
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Figure 5: Residualized Child Earnings and Taxes
Notes: See Table 4 and notes to Figure 3. In these graphs, we ﬁrst regress out child age to
keep the range of the y-axis from being too large.
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Figure 7: Child Educational Attainment
Notes: See Table 5 and notes to Figure 3.
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Table 1: First Stage RD Estimates of the Reform on Parental DI
Dependent variable Mean First Stage
A. Parental DI beneﬁts 10.063 -1.300**
(in 1,000 euros) (.095)
B. Parental exit from DI 0.114 0.054**
(0.005)
Observations 116,356
Notes: The sample is parents between the ages of 40-50 and on DI as of the reform date of
August 1, 1993, who were still on DI in 1995, and had children living at home around the
time of the reform. Parental DI beneﬁts measure payments received in 1999, indexed to the
year 2014. Parental exit measures whether the parent has exited DI by 1999. All coeﬃcients
are estimated using an RD model with separate linear trends on each side of the cutoﬀ and
triangular weights. Parent control variables are measured as of January 1, 1996 and include
age, birth month dummies, a gender dummy, a cubic in pre-disability earnings, a dummy
for no pre-disability earnings, six dummies for degree of disability, a cubic in DI duration,
a dummy for native Dutch, a marriage dummy, and number of children in the household;
child control variables include age and a gender dummy. Parents appear more than once if
they have more than one child. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the parent level.
**p<0.05, *p<0.10
Table 2: RD Estimates of Child DI Participation
Child outcome in 2014 Mean RF IV
A. Ever on DI .104 -.011** .009**
(.004) (.004)
B. Cumulative days on DI 298 -47.2** 37.5**
(13.9) (14.6)
Observations 116,356
Notes: See notes to Table 1. The independent variables measure whether a child ever partic-
ipated in DI between 1996 and 2014 and the cumulative number of days on DI between 1996
and 2014. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the parent level.
**p<0.05, *p<0.10
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Table 3: RD Estimates of Child Beneﬁts from DI and Other Government Programs
Child outcome in 2014 (in 1,000 euros) Mean RF IV
A. DI beneﬁts
A1. Cumulative DI income 10.107 -1.578** 1.256**
(.499) (.522)
B. Other beneﬁts
B1. Cumulative UI income 5.639 -.067 .053
(.162) (.167)
B2. Cumulative general assistance income 4.432 .092 -.073
(traditional cash welfare) (.266) (.272)
B3. Cumulative misc. beneﬁt income 3.675 .067 -.053
(all other government safety net programs) (.145) (.149)
B4. Cumulative total beneﬁts, excluding DI 13.746 .092 -.073
(B1+B2+B3) (.379) (.388)
Observations 116,356
Notes: See notes to Table 1. Independent variables measure cumulative amounts between
1996 and 2014, indexed to the year 2014. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the
parent level.
**p<0.05, *p<0.10
Table 4: RD Estimates of Child Earnings and Taxes
Child outcome in 2014 (in 1,000 euros) Mean RF IV
A. Cumulative income from work 371.282 7.178** -5.711*
(2.836) (2.951)
B. Cumulative estimated taxes 109.565 1.997** -1.589
(.969) (1.008)
C. Cumulative taxes minus transfers 85.712 3.483** -2.772**
(taxes - DI beneﬁts - other beneﬁts) (1.271) (1.325)
Observations 116,356
Notes: See Table 3 and notes to Table 1. Independent variables measure cumulative amounts
between 1996 and 2014, indexed to the year 2014. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered
at the parent level.
**p<0.05, *p<0.10
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Table 5: RD Estimates of Child Educational Investments
Child outcome in 2014 Mean RF IV
A. Years of education 11.49 .117** -.096**
(.050) (.050)
B. Lower secondary school or more .95 -.001 .001
(.003) (.003)
C. Upper secondary school or more .78 .022** -.018**
(.007) (.007)
D. Bachelor degree or more .33 .017** .-014*
(.008) (.008)
E. Master degree or more .10 .009* -.008
(.005) (.005)
F. Advanced degree or more .01 -.001 .001
(.001) (.001)
Observations 79,924
Notes: See notes to Table 1. Education is measured as of 2014. Upper secondary school or
more includes both academic and vocational tracks. The sample size in this table is smaller,
as education data is a census for younger cohorts, but a sample for older cohorts. Standard
errors in parentheses, clustered at the parent level.
**p<0.05, *p<0.10
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Table 6: RD Estimates by Age of Child
Child age: 18 and younger Child age: 19 and older
Child outcome in 2014 Mean RF IV Mean RF IV
A. Ever on DI .093 -.019** .017** .114 -.006 .004
(.006) (.006) (.006) (.005)
B. Cumulative days on DI 265 -64.9** 58.5** 330 -36.4* 25.7
(19.3) (19.3) (20.0) (16.4)
C. Cumulative DI income 8.677 -2.184** 1.968** 11.480 -1.293* .912
(in 1,000 euro) (.650) (.748) (.747) (.613)
D. Cum. total beneﬁts, excl. DI 11.553 -.318 .287 15.851 .332 -.234
(in 1,000 euro) (.467) (.515) (.584) (.472)
E. Cumulative income from work 290.500 4.744 -4.274 448.788 7.998* -5.640
(in 1,000 euro) (3.080) (3.080) (4.417) (3.616)
F. Cumulative estimated taxes 80.228 0.944 0.851 137.714 2.462 -1.736
(in 1,000 euro) (.973) (1.072) (1.577) (1.295)
G. Years of education 11.57 .171** -.162** 11.39 .065 -.045
(.067) (.080) (.069) (.052)
H. Upper secondary school or more .775 .028** -.026** .783 .015 -.011
(.009) (.011) (.010) (.007)
I. First Stage: Parental DI beneﬁts -1.110** -1.418**
(in 1,000 euro, for A-F) (.132) (.110)
J. First Stage: Parental DI beneﬁts -1.052** -1.452**
(in 1,000 euro, for G, H) (.144) (.139)
Observations (A-F) 56,974 59,382
Observations (G, H) 45,913 34,011
Notes: See notes to Tables 1-5. Child age is measured as of November 1996, which is when
the Dutch Parliament passed the motion to grandfather in the 45-50 year olds under the old
DI rules.
**p<0.05, *p<0.10
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Table 7: Placebo Tests  RD Estimates for Parents Not on DI in 1995
Child outcome in 2014 Mean RF
A. Ever on DI .057 -.0002
(.0009)
B. Cumulative days on DI 158 -2.126
(3.232)
C. Cumulative DI income 5.346 -.150
(in 1,000 euro) (.117)
D. Cumulative total beneﬁts, excluding DI 8.761 .042
(in 1,000 euro) (.092)
E. Cumulative income from work 378.393 -.041
(in 1,000 euro) (.940)
F. Cumulative estimated taxes 110.906 -.178
(in 1,000 euro) (.360)
G. Years of education 12.56 .010
(.015)
H. Upper secondary school or more 0.87 .0000
(.0016)
Observations (A-F) 1,286,355
Observations (G, H) 971,599
Notes: The placebo sample is comprised of children whose parents were not on DI as of
1995. Since these parents are all subject to the new DI rules (regardless of their age), there
should be no discontinuity at the cutoﬀ in any of the child outcomes. See notes to Tables
1-5 for details on the RD estimator, the included control variables, and the child outcome
variables. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the parent level.
**p<0.05, *p<0.10
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Table 8: OLS Estimates
Indep. var.: Parental DI payments in 1996
(in 1,000 euros)
Parent age: 40-45 Parent age: 45-50
Child outcome in 2014 Mean OLS Mean OLS
A. Ever on DI .060 .003** .070 .003**
(.000) (.000)
B. Cumulative days on DI 164 8.6** 203 8.4**
(.3) (.3)
C. Cumulative DI income 5.495 .293** 7.039 .289**
(in 1,000 euro) (.009) (.010)
D. Cumulative total beneﬁts, excl. DI 9.160 .230** 10.707 .235**
(in 1,000 euro) (.007) (.008)
E. Cumulative income from work 347.254 -2.383** 442.195 -2.964**
(in 1,000 euro) (.062) (.080)
F. Cumulative estimated taxes 99.245 -.668** 134.848 -.933**
(in 1,000 euro) (.023) (.032)
G. Years of education 12.39 -.052** 12.47 -.050**
(.001) (.001)
H. Upper secondary school or more .85 -.005** .87 -.005**
(.000) (.000)
Observations (A-F) 498,378 421,731
Observations (G, H) 387,264 287,799
Notes: Sample includes children still living at home for all parents between the ages of 40-50,
regardless of whether the parent was on DI as of the reform date. The sample is split into
two parental age groups (40-45 and 45-50 as of the reform date) to ensure that the stricter DI
rules for those parents under versus over the age 45 cutoﬀ do not drive the OLS estimates.
Parent control variables are measured as of January 1, 1996 and include age, birth month
dummies, a gender dummy, a dummy for Native Dutch, a marriage dummy, and number of
children in the household; child control variables include age and a gender dummy. Standard
errors in parentheses, clustered at the parent level.
**p<0.05, *p<0.10
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Appendix Figure A1: Child Age as of the Reform Date of August 1993
Notes: Kernel density estimates of child age, trimmed to exclude 0.3 percent of the data for
visual clarity.
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Appendix Figure A2: Eﬀect of the Reform on Parents
Note: Graphs mirror those in Figure 2, but with 3 month age bins.
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Appendix Figure A3: Child DI Participation
Note: Graphs mirror those in Figure 3, but with 3 month age bins.
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Appendix Figure A4: Child DI and Other Beneﬁt Receipt
Note: Graphs mirror those in Figure 4, but with 3 month age bins.
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Appendix Figure A5: Residualized Child Earnings and Taxes
Note: Graphs mirror those in Figure 5, but with 3 month age bins.
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Appendix Figure A6: Child Educational Attainment
Note: Graphs mirror those in Figure 7, but with 3 month age bins.
Appendix Table A1: Summary Statistics
Parent age: Parent age:
Overall 40-45 45-50
A. Parents
Female 0.27 0.29 0.26
Married 0.87 0.87 0.87
Age (Aug 1993) 45.17 42.58 47.36
Duration DI (months) 88.38 85.20 91.08
Degree of disability
15-25% 0.10 0.14 0.07
25-35% 0.12 0.14 0.10
35-45% 0.08 0.09 0.08
45-55% 0.07 0.06 0.08
55-65% 0.02 0.02 0.03
65-80% 0.02 0.02 0.03
80-100% (Full disability) 0.58 0.53 0.63
Pre-DI earnings (euros) 6,529 6,249 6,766
Native Dutch 0.91 0.91 0.91
Number of kids in HH 1.71 1.87 1.58
Parent observations 70,319 32,279 38,040
B. Children
Female 0.44 0.46 0.41
Age (Aug 1993) 15.60 13.86 17.27
Child observations 116,356 57,028 59,328
Notes: The sample in panel A is parents between the ages of 40-50 and on DI as of the
reform date of August 1, 1993, who were still on DI in 1995, and had children living at
home around the time of the reform. The sample in panel B is the children of these parents.
A degree of disability between 0-15% does not qualify for DI beneﬁts. Variables are measured
as of January 1, 1996, unless otherwise indicated.
**p<0.05, *p<0.10
Appendix Table A2: RD Estimates of Child Crime and Marriage Outcomes
Child outcome in 2014 Mean RF IV
A. Ever arrested .135 -.0021 .0016
(.0043) (.0044)
B. Ever incarcerated .018 -.0030* .0024
(.0017) (.0017)
C. Ever married .458 .0107* -.0084
(.0062) (.0063)
D. Ever cohabiting (with a child) .300 -.0049 .0038
(.0058) (.0059)
Observations 123,186
Notes: See notes to Table 1. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the parent level.
**p<0.05, *p<0.10
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Appendix Table A4: Characteristics of Compliers
Parent age:
Compliers 44.5-45.5 Diﬀerence
A. Parents
Female .208** .226** -.018
(.016) (.003) (.016)
Married .927** .896** .032**
(.013) (.002) (.012)
Duration DI (months) 98.697 88.943** 9.754**
(2.804) (.432) (2.760)
Degree of disability
15-25% .100** .086** .014
(.014) (.002) (.014)
25-35% .077** .118** -.040**
(.015) (.002) (.015)
35-45% .166** .094** .072**
(.014) (.002) (.013)
45-55% .099** .076** .023*
(.012) (.002) (.012)
55-65% .035** .026** .010
(.008) (.001) (.008)
65-80% .041** .027** .015**
(.007) (.001) (.007)
80-100% (Full disability) .481** .574** -.093**
(.020) (.003) (.020)
Pre-DI earnings 6,586.082** 6,723.887** -137.806
(151.404) (22.464) (149.599)
Native Dutch .910** .916** -.006
(.011) (.002) (.011)
Number of kids in HH 2.051** 2.078** -.027
(.042) (.006) (.041)
B. Children
Female .450** .442** .007
(.021) (.003) (.021)
Age (Aug 1993) 15.710** 15.634** .076
(.182) (.028) (.179)
Notes: See notes to Table A1. For details on how to calculate the complier averages, see
Borghans et al. (2014).
**p<0.05, *p<0.10
